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Ramanuja and Schleiermacher On Language: 
Comparative Theology for Constructive Theology 
Jon Paul Sydnor 
Emmanuel College 
THE truth of the Veda is affirmed in the 
aphorism, 'The relation of words to facts is 
natural [autpattika: inherent, original, 
primordial] (Mimamsa Sutras 1.1.7)'. Just as 
fire and water do naturally possess their 
properties like heat, just as the senses like 
sight and hearing are naturally productive of 
particular kinds of cognition, words also 
have a natural power of imparting 
knowledge. 1 
The whole work of the Redeemer 
Himself was conditioned by the 
communicability .of His self-consciousness 
by means of speech, and similarly 
Christianity has always and everywhere 
spread itself solely by preaching. Every 
proposition which can be an element of the 
Christian preaching (kerygma) is also a 
doctrine, because it bears witness to the 
determination of the religious self-
consciousness as inward certainty . . . Thus 
this communication is, on the one hand, 
something different from the piety itself, 
though the latter cannot, any more than 
anything else which is human, be conceived 
entirely separated from all communication. 
But, on the other hand, the doctrines in all 
their forms have their ultimate ground so 
exclusively in the emotions of the reiigious 
self-consciousness, that where these do not 
exist the doctrines cannot arise.2 
Introduction 
If comparative theology is to produce 
constructive theology, then must that resulting 
constructive theology be syncretistic? This 
question may very weli prove to be 
consequential for the future of comparative 
theology. If comparative theology can prove 
itself to be methodologically potent in 
theological construction, then this utility will 
legitimate its practice. However, if comparative 
theology is solely able to produce syncretistic 
constructive theology, then the practice of 
comparative theology will be limited to those 
who are open to such syncretism. This audience 
may prove to be small. If so, then comparative 
theology may never integrate with the broader 
theological world. 
A second option may be available. If 
comparative theology can produce discrete, non-
syncretistic constructive theology, then the use 
of this potent method may expand dramatically, 
as it would include those who might shy away 
from syncretism. The purpos~ of this paper is to 
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explicitly demonstrate the discrete or non-
syncretistic constructive potential of 
comparative theology. It will do so by placing 
two theologians-the Srivaisnava Ramanuja and 
the ReformedlLutheran Schleiermacher-into 
conversation with each other on the subject of 
language. In so doing, the paper will 
demonstrate that comparative theology has the 
potential to produce constructive theology. 
Moreover, this constructive theology need not be 
syncretistic. 
In demonstrating this possibility we 
recognize that, in certain theological quarters, an 
allergy to syncretism already exists. 
Nevertheless, in this paper no allergy to 
syncretism is being prescribed. Indeed, judicious 
syncretism may very well be an appropriate 
constructive move. The purpose of this paper is 
definitively not to establish the uselessness, 
superfluity, or even ancillary nature of 
comparative constructive theology. The purpose 
of this paper is to demonstrate . that an 
interreligious dialectic can further theologies 
along their pre-existing trajectories, along 
. parallel paths that need not converge. In other 
words, post-comparative theology may be 
discretely constructed. The paper will conclude 
that comparative theology can advance religious 
thought either syncretistic ally or discretely, 
according to the disposition of the comparativist 
and her target audience. 
Comparison 
Schleiermacher and Ramanuja have 
pronouncedly divergent doctrines of language. 
For Ramanuja, Sanskrit is eternal. As eternal, it 
is uncreated by Brahman but preserved through 
periods of dissolution and re-creation in the 
mind of Brahman. Sanskrit is the means of 
creation itself, and as such Sanskrit imprints 
reality with its own grammar, rendering creation 
and Sanskrit unitary in structure. For 
Schleiermacher, all language is a historical 
phenomenon, changing from place to place and 
from time to time. Language is not the medium 
of creation; it is an aspect of creation. Indeed, 
Schleiermacher deems the "Mosaic" (Hebrew) 
account of creation-which, in Genesis Chapter 
One, is mediated by language-to be irrelevant 
to the feeling of absolute dependence, and hence 
Ramanuja and Schleiermacher On Language 33 
irrelevant to dogmatics.3 (This dismissal is not 
due to the divine use of language, but due to the 
presentation of creation as an' event in time 
rather than the eternal preservation of the 
cosmos.) 
Because Schleiermacher deems language to 
be an aftermath of creation, he sees no 
correlation between· the grammar of any 
language and the grammar of reality. Ramanuja, 
asserting such a correlation,' subordinates 
religious consciousness to language. He asserts 
that the consciousness of the Vedantin is to be 
structured by the Sanskrit of the Veda, as 
augmented by auxiliary texts such as the 
dharmasastras, itihasas, and puranas.4 
Schleiermacher disagrees, subordinating 
language to the religious consciousness. He 
asserts that the unarticulated Christian 
consciousness is possessed of tremendous 
language-forming potential which culminates in 
dogmatic theology. 
This distinction has enormous implications 
for the respective missiologies of Ramanuja and 
Schleiermacher. For Schleiermacher, the feeling 
of absolute dependence upon our God who is 
love is inherently translatable into any culture in 
any time and any place. The Christian God-
consciousness is, if you will, a content without 
form. It must be granted form through the 
culture in which it manifests itself.5 This 
manifestation can occur through any culture. In 
fact, so perfectly translatable is this content that 
no culture is to be preferred over any other 
culture, and no language is to be preferred Over 
any other language. Christ's consciousness is as 
articulable in 19th century Germany as it is in 1 st 
century Palestine, in German as it is in Aramaic. 
Indeed, Christ's consciousness is as articulable 
in Tamil as it is in Sanskrit. For Schleiermacher, 
the feeling of absolute dependence is plastic, 
assUming the form of whatever culture it 
encounters.6 
Ramanuja's Brahman-consciousness, if we 
may call it that, does not share the plasticity of 
Schleiermacher's God-consciousness. Instead, 
for Ramanuja,the consciousness of the 
moksapara (seeker of liberation) must be 
Sanskritized. So, this consciousness can only be 
manifested through one linguistic form rather 
than many linguistic forms. Ramanuja's 
valuation of Sanskrit is a result of, and dovetails 
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with, his holistic exegesis of the Veda. 
Ramanuja retains the karma kanda, or ritual 
portion of tKe Veda, and the jnana kanda, or 
knowledge portion of the Veda, as necessary but 
ancillary adjuncts to the bhakti kanda, or 
devotional portion of the Veda. Crucially, these 
rituals and this knowledge are in Sanskrit and 
cannot be translated. That is, analogous 
sentences in other languages will of necessity 
lack the salvific phenomenological import of the 
Sanskrit.7 
While later Visistadvaitins may have 
asserted that these three kandas could be 
bypassed by means of prapatti, there is no 
explicit allowance for such a circumvention in 
Ramanuja's own work. Quite the contrary, there 
is prescribed a multifaceted devotional practice 
which prepares the moksapara to receive moksa 
(release). And this preparation involves the 
inculcation of Sanskritic "mental impressions" 
(samskaras) preserved from beginningless time.8 
Only Sanskrit has an inherent relation to reality, 
both spiritual and material. Therefore, only 
Sanskrit vocabulary· in Vedic word order 
generates those "mental impressions" which are 
preparatory to release. For this reason, the 
release-seeking consciousness must be 
Sanskritized. No other language will serve. 
While neither Ramanuja nor Schleiermacher 
allow for contradictions in their theological 
systems, both present different understandings 
of the problem of contradiction. For Ramanuja, 
any contradiction in the scriptures must be 
apparent rather than real, since scripture is 
derived immediately from Brahman, from whom 
no contradiction could appear. These 
contradictions can be resolved through the 
application of reason to all relevant scriptural 
passages, by which means all contradictions can 
be resolved in one holistic exegesis.9 
Schleiermacher believes that contradictions are 
symptomatic of poetic and rhetorical forms of 
Christian expression which are so occasional as 
to lack systematic preclSlon. These 
contradictions can be resolved through the 
collocation of poetic, rhetorical, and Christ's 
own expressions into one rigorous system of 
"descriptively didactic" doctrine-or, in other 
words, a dogmatic. lO 
Several other issues are raised through the 
comparison of Ramanuja and Schleiermacher's 
doctrines of language. For one, a comparative 
reading of Ramanuja's doctrine of Sanskrit as 
eternal calls into question Schleiermacher's 
attempt to stabilize temporal German through 
dialectic and systematization, without reference 
. to any abiding verbal meaning. Ramanuja also 
recognizes the instability of everyday, historical 
words, as he notes the difference in definition 
between Sanskritic words in their Vedic context 
and the same words in everyday use. However, 
his solution to the challenge of historical 
language is more radical. He ascribes to 
scripture an eternal meaning which is accessible 
through rigorous exegetical practice. Successful 
exegesis requires intensive, sequential study of 
the Veda (Purva Mimamsa first, then Uttara 
Mimamsa), a learned guru, study of the Puranas 
and other texts which expound the Veda, and the 
activation of all acquired knowledge through 
upasana, or devotional meditation. In this way, 
the inherent meaning of Vedic words in Vedic 
sentences can be discerned, which will stimulate 
a phenomenal experience which, activated 
through devotional meditation, leads to 
salvation. 11 
In contrast, Schleiermacher's understanding 
of language as historical, coupled with his 
demand of a fixed meaning for words, seems 
problematic. Although Schleiermacher never 
explicitly . describes language as a historical 
phenomenon, that he understood it to be so 
seems a legitimate inference from his highly 
historical understanding of human thought. 
Indeed, Schleiermacher defmes dogmatic 
theology as "the science which systematizes the 
doctrine prevalent in a Christian Church at a 
given time.,,12 From this statement we may infer 
that (within certain parameters) dogmatic 
theology, as well as its vocabulary, will be 
different in different places at different times. 
This variability obtains despite the invariable 
feeling of absolute dependence upon our God 
who is love that underlies all Christian feeling 
and hence, all Christian theology. While 
implicitly asserting the historical nature of 
language, Schleiermacher also asserts both the 
need to and the possibility of stabilizing a 
word's meaning through placing it in dialectical 
relationship with other words, within the context 
of a coherent system of theological propositions. 
r 
! 
I 
L 
3
Sydnor: Ramanuja and Schleiermacher On Language: Comparative Theology for Constructive Theology
Published by Digital Commons @ Butler University, 2009
L 
Problems arise when we consider twin 
characteristics of Schleiermacher's doctrine of 
language, which may very well be exclusive. To 
begin, Schleiermacher's concept of dogmatics 
necessitates a dialectical linguistics within a 
system of propositions which is self-contained 
(abgeschlossen: secluded, solitary, enclosed).13 
Dogmatics is to comprise a complete system 
(Vollstandigkeit des Lehrgebaudes)14 that 
provides an absolute context (in einem absoluten 
Zusammenhang)15 for all propositional language, 
thereby establishing a perfectly defmite relation 
among them (unter ihnen vollkommen bestimmt 
sind).16 This self-containment we may deem the 
"introverted" character of Schleiermacher's 
theology. That is, in order to be perfectly precise 
and perfectly stable, it must be perfectly self-
referential. The finitude of the internal referents, 
coupled with the vast number of their mutual 
relations, generates a fixed system in which each 
referent is defined, directly or indirectly, by 
every other referent. And through this system 
meaning becomes precise, stable, and scientific. 
But at the same time, Schleiermacher also 
prescribes an "extroverted" theology. He 
specifically states in the Glaubenslehre's 
Introduction that dogmatics will eagerly seek to 
utilize the language of ethics, philosophy of 
religion, apologetics, psychology, etc. in order to 
discuss how religious feeling becomes 
diversified and what object it refers to. In other 
words, dogmatics will borrow the scientific 
terminology of these realms in order to more 
precisely express itself. His own Introduction 
does not qualify as dogmatics, under 
Schleiermacher's own definition, because it is 
not a disclosure of the specifically Christian 
consciousness. Nevertheless, in order to 
introduce his dogmatics Schleiermacher borrows 
propositions from ethics, philosophy of religion, 
apologetics, and psychology. 
Problematically, Schleiermacher is 
borrowing vocabulary from outside his finite, 
self-contained system. But such borrowing 
opens up the system to vocabulary which is no 
longer fixed through defmite relationship. The 
introduction of anyone term which is not fixed 
by relation will, of necessity, destabilize the 
entire system. Thus the tension between 
Schleiermacher's introverted need for a finite, 
fixed, precise terminology and extroverted need 
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for borrowed scientific terminology seem to be 
at odds. It is not that faith and science are at 
odds; Schleiermacher would eschew any tension 
between faith and science, and much of his 
program is directed toward resolving that 
perceived tension. But there is a tension between 
the static nature of perfectly stable dogmatic 
language and the dynamic nature of 
investigative scientific language. Within this 
context, any stability one might achieve will be 
but momentary, and momentary stability is 
oxymoronic. 
Schleiermacher himself notes this danger, as 
he notes that changes in philosophical language 
often result in changes in dogmatic language. 17 It 
is possible that external vocabulary is borrowed 
first, and then stabilized through incorporation 
into the system. But the ongoing life of the term 
outside of the system will still threaten any fixed 
definition. Even "absolute contexts" have 
contexts within the realm of language and 
culture.' This observatio:n only raises the tension 
between scientific precision and linguistic 
dynamism. Dogmatics must adapt to history, and 
dogmatics must be exact. But historical 
dynamism precludes perfect precision. 
If historical language is, iri fact, an imperfect 
medium of religious communication, then 
Schleiermacher faces a more profound problem. 
He specifically states that "the whole work of 
the Redeemer Himself was conditioned by the 
communicability of His self-consciousness by 
means of speech [Rede] , and similarly 
Christianity has always and everywhere spread 
itself solely by preaching [Verkilndigung].,,18 In 
other words, Christ effects redemption through 
the communication (Mitteilung) of his sinless 
perfection. 19 But perfection would seem to 
necessitate a perfect medium for 
communication. Incongruously, Schleiermacher 
does not ascribe this perfection, or its possibility, 
to language. While Schleiermacher notes that 
communication also occurs through gesture and 
countenance, the centrality of preaching renders 
speech fundamental to religious communication. 
With reference to individuals, 
Schleiermacher states that "the discovery of this 
differentiating 'matter [between individuals] in 
any individual existence is a task which can 
never be perfectly, but only approximately, 
discharged in words and sentences.,,20 But if 
4
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Christ cannot perfectly distinguish himself from 
imperfect human beings, then by what means' 
can his perfection be discerned? Since his self-
consciousness was origiIially conveyed by non-
technical, non-dogmatic, imperfect speech, then 
how was the perfection of his self-consciousness 
mediated by the imperfection of that form of 
language? Insofar as such questions cast doubt 
on the possibility of redemption, they threaten to 
undermine Schleiermacher's entire dogmatic 
system. 
To a certain extent, this point is moot. After 
all, the power of language to communicate 
redemption is ratified by Christ's use of 
language, not Schleiermacher's doctrine of 
language.21 However, at this point it is not clear 
that Schleiermacher's doctrine of language 
dovetails with Christ's legitimation of language. 
A comparative reading of Ramanuja and 
Schleiermacher on this point suggests that 
clarification is needed; comparison has 
presented a constructive opportunity. However, 
Schleiermacher would not likely tum to 
Ramanuja's "magical" doctrine of language in 
order to resolve any contradiction within his 
own. We might expect instead a more 
naturalistic approach. Perhaps he would indeed 
deem stability to be but momentary, or define 
perfect stability as. a goal to be approached 
asymptotically. Whatever the reconciliation, the 
postulated constructive response to Ramanuja's 
challenge would not likely be syncretistic given 
Schleiermacher's own concerns about "alien" 
(fremd: foreign, strange, external) influences. 
(Again, this is Schleiermacher's position, not the 
position of this essay.) 
Another interesting point of contact arises 
between Ramanuja and Schleiermacher. We 
noted above that due to the assertion of 
consonance between Sanskrit and reality, 
Ramanuja is able to make linguistic arguments 
with ontological consequences. For example, he 
argues. that because language is differentiated, 
and because differentiated language describes 
Brahman, then Brahman must be 
differentiated.22 Schleiermacher, like the 
Advaitins, ascribes simplicity to God.23 But he 
offers a very different interpretation, closer to 
the Srivaisnava position, insofar as he defmes 
simplicity as "the unseparated and inseparable 
mutual inherence of all divine attributes and 
activities.,,24 Nevertheless, we may be tempted 
to ask based on reading Ramanuja: can 
Schleiermacher ascribe such simplicity to God 
by means of differentiated language? 
It would appear as if Schleiermacher is not 
bound to address this question, since he does not 
share Ramanuja's linguistic ontology. That is, 
arguments cannot be made from the nature of 
language to the nature of reality for two reasons. 
First, Schleiermacher's dogmatics is not 
concerned with the objective nature of reality 
but with the felt experience of salvation. Second, 
Schleiermacher ascribes no ontological acumen 
to language. It simply does not have the 
primordial generativity that Ramanuja's Sanskrit 
has, and is therefore not a cipher for the nature 
of the universe or of the divine. 
However, Schleiermacher may also question 
Ramanuja on the relationship between divinity 
and language. Ramanuja describes Brahman as 
eternal.25 At the same time, Ramanuja asserts the 
reliability of Vedic language as a means of 
knowledge (pram ana) of Brahman. And as 
noted above, he asserts that because language is 
differentiated, Brahman must be differentiated 
rather than undifferentiated, as the Advaitins 
would claim. But we can also note that language 
is temporal. Words occur in time. At the precise 
moment that a word such as "eternal" (nityai6 is 
being spoken, at the center of that moment, part 
of the word lies in the past, part in the present, 
and part in the future. "Eternal" describes 
Brahman, but as a spoken word it is divided by 
time. Therefore, according to Ramanuja's 
doctrine of language, we could plausibly infer 
that Brahman must be divided by time. But 
Brahman cannot be divided by time, because 
Brahman is eternal. This (possible) quandary 
may present a challenge to contemporary 
Srivaisnava theologians. If so, then comparison 
has produced another constructive opportunity. 
Yet again, Srivaisnava theologians would not 
likely respond to this challenge through any 
adoption of Schleiermacher's naturalistic 
doctrine of language. Instead, they would more 
likely look to their own resources, perhaps 
postulating an eternal form of language, of 
which temporal language is but a manifestation. 
In any event, their response to the 
Schleiermachian challenge would be wholly 
Srivaisnava, rather than Schleiermachian. 
T 
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Finally, the comparison of our two 
theologians raises interesting questions 
regarding hermeneutics, stability, and precision. 
As noted above, both theologians ask to what 
degree precise language is necessary for 
successful religious communication. In the end, 
both Ramanuja and Schleiermacher demand 
precision, although in very different ways. 
Schleiermacher attempts to establish technically 
precise language within a historical framework, 
without reference to eternal, abiding meanings. 
Ramanuja, on the other hand, asserts the eternal 
meaning of Vedic words in Vedic word order. 
Oddly, this eternal meaning generates an 
exceptionally dynamic exegetical tradition. 
Srivaisnava scriptural interpretation changes 
over time. For Srivaisnavism, does this 
dynamism suggest error and its correction, or 
can change reflect the continuous development 
of an originally authentic yet insufficiently 
articulated exegetical impulse (in accordance 
with Schleiermacher's understanding of the 
development of doctrine through time)? In other 
words, could Schleiermacher's treatment of 
doctrinal development assist Srivaisnavas in 
justifying their own exegetical dynamism? For 
our purposes, answering such questions would 
necessitate excessive speculation. In speculative 
areas such as these, it is best to allow traditions 
to speak for themselves. Nevertheless, once 
again comparison has produced an opportunity 
for discrete construction. Were Srivaisnavas to 
utilize Schleiermacher's concept of doctrinal 
development in order to explain their own 
exegetical dynamism, then only minor 
adaptation would be necessary. This aspect of 
Schleiermacher's thought could be incorporated 
into Srivaisnava thought, leaving it (possibly) 
more articulate yet wholly faithful to the pre-
existing Srivaisnava theological trajectory. 
Ramanuja and Schleiermacher produce 
vastly different linguistics. Nevertheless, their 
comparison across a vast expanse of space and 
time has proven fruitful. New questions have 
arisen through our comparison, questions which 
might otherwise have lain dormant. We have 
elicited latent aspects of each theologian. In 
other words, Ramanuja and Schleiermacher have 
spoken differently in inter-religious dialogue 
than either would have spoken in intra-religious 
dialogue. 
Ramanuja and Schleiermacher On Language 37 
This outcome is extremely consequential. 
The generation of a question is a precious event, 
for it allows the possibility of an answer. New 
questions generate new answers, and new 
answers constitute constructive theology. So 
comparative theology, if fruitfully executed, 
inevitably leads to constructive theology. 
Additionally, this constructive theology need not 
be syncretistic (although it may legitimately be 
so, if this is the disposition of the constructivist). 
We have not had the space or presumptiveness, 
in this essay, to answer the new questions. 
However, we have demonstrated that the 
questions generated through comparison can be 
answered from the tradition's own resources, 
without resorting to syncretism. This utility is 
consequential-it may expand the practice of 
comparative theology beyond its current 
confines into those theological quarters which 
are less comfortable with explicit syncretism. 
The methodological potency of comparative 
theology for constructive theology has therefore 
been demonstrated, be it discrete (as in this case) 
or syncretistic. 
Notes 
Ramanuja. Vedarthasamgraha. S.S. 
Raghavachar, transl. Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna 
Ashrama, 1956. Para. 227, page 177. "The 
relation of words to facts is natural." Skt: 
autpattikastu sabdasyarthena sambandhah. Van 
Buitenen translates: "Meaning is inherent in the 
word." Van Buitenen, J.A.B. Ramanuja's 
Vedarthasamgraha: Introduction, Critical 
Edition and Annotated Translation. Pune: 
Deccan College Postgraduate and Research 
Institute, 1992. Brahmavadin translates: "The 
relationship of a word with its meaning is indeed 
eternal." The Brahmavadin: A Fortnightly 
Religious and Philosophical Journal. Madras: 
Thompson and Company, 1896-1912. Vols. 1.1 
through 17.8. Raghavachar's term "natural" 
represents a loose translation, and does not mean 
"derived from nature." "Autpattika" literally 
means "original," or "from/at the beginning." In 
other words, the universal form of the object 
does not prece!ie its appellation, although the 
universal form and the appellation do precede 
any particular object. So, because universal form 
and appellation are eternally cognate, meaning is 
more primordial than natural: "The relationship 
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between the word and its meaning is 
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2 Schleiermacher, Friedrich. The Christian 
Faith. Trans. by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. 
Stewart. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1999. § 15.2, 
77-78. 
3 The Christian Faith. §40.3, 15I. 
4 Vedarthasamgraha. §232-233, 180-18I. 
5 The Christian Faith. §15.2, 77. 
6 cf. Lamin Sanneh. Translating the Message: 
The Missionary Impact on Culture. New York: 
Orbis Books, 1989. 197-207. 
7 Vedarthasamgraha. §127, 99-100. Ramanuja's 
Srivaisnava tradition later came to regard Tamil 
as a second language of revelation, thereby 
diminishing the need for a Sanskritized 
consciousness. 
8 Vedarthasamgraha. Van Buitenen translation. 
§139, 233. See also Brahmavadin. §231, 677. 
Here, samskara is translated as "innate 
impressions. " 
9 Vedarthasamgraha. §277, 177. 
10 The Christian Faith. §18.2, 86. 
11 Ramanuja. Brahma-Sutras: Sri 
Swami Vireswarananda and 
Adidevananda, transl. Calcutta: 
Ashrama, 1995. §I.I.1, 1-3. 
Bhasya. 
Swami 
Advaita 
12 The Christian Faith. § 19 (Proposition), 88. 
13 The Christian Faith. §20 (Proposition), 94. 
14 The Christian Faith. §18.3, 87. 
15 The Christian Faith. §28.2, 120. 
16 The Christian Faith. §28.2, 120. 
17 The Christian Faith. §19 (Postscript), 93. 
18 The Christian Faith. §15.2, 77. 
19 The Christian Faith. §88 (Proposition), 361. 
20 The Christian Faith. §10.3, 47. 
21 The Christian Faith. §15.2, 77. 
22 Vedarthasamgraha. §19, 20-21. 
23 The Christian Faith. §96.1, 392. 
24 The Christian Faith. §56.1, 231. 
25 Vedarthasamgraha. §157, 126-127. 
26 Vedarthasamgraha. §157, 125-127. Brahman 
is characterized as nitya, or eternal. 
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